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Recent years have provided increasing insights into the factors affecting economic
decision-making. Little is known about how these factors influence decisions that also
bear consequences for other people. We examined whether decisions that also affected a
third, passive player modulate the behavioral and neural responses to monetary offers
in a modified version of the three-person ultimatum game. We aimed to elucidate to
what extent social preferences affect early neuronal processing when subjects were
evaluating offers that were fair or unfair to themselves, to the third player, or to both.
As an event-related potential (ERP) index for early evaluation processes in economic
decision-making, we recorded the medial frontal negativity (MFN) component in response
to such offers. Unfair offers were rejected more often than equitable ones, in particular
when negatively affecting the subject. While the MFN amplitude was higher following
unfair as compared to fair offers to the subject, MFN amplitude was not modulated by
the shares assigned to the third, passive player. Furthermore, rejection rates and MFN
amplitudes following fair offers were positively correlated, as subjects showing lower MFN
amplitudes following fair offers tended to reject unfair offers more often—but only if those
offers negatively affected their own payoff. Altogether, the rejection behavior suggests that
humans mainly care about a powerless third when they are confronted with inequality
as well. The correlation between rejection rates and the MFN amplitude supports the
notion that this ERP component is also modulated by positive events and highlights how
our expectations concerning other humans’ behavior guide our own decisions. However,
social preferences like inequality aversion and concern for the well-being of others are not
reflected in this early neuronal response, but seem to result from later, deliberate and
higher-order cognitive processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Most economic models assume that people are solely motivated
by their own material payoff, i.e., they always choose what is
best for them. In recent years, this view, the so called self-interest
hypothesis, has been questioned. Awell-known experiment which
shows that this hypothesis does not fully account for human
behavior in economic decision-making is the so called ultimatum
game(Güth et al., 1982). In this two-persongameaproposerhas to
split a certain amount of money between a responder and himself
followed by the decision of the responder whether to accept or
reject it. If the offer is accepted themoney is allotted accordingly—
however, if the responder rejects the offer both players receive
nothing. Assuming that both players behave rationally and thus
do not care about the outcome of the other, the responder would
have to accept any positive outcome and the proposer should
offer the smallest amount of money. In reality, most of the offers
accepted by the responder are about 40–50% of the total amount
while offers below 20% are rejected with a probability of about
50% (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer and Richard, 1995).
Observations like these which indicate that people are self-
interested but also inequality averse led to a reformulation of
models of economic decision-making, and the addition of “other-
regarding” preferences to these models. More specifically, models
of social preferences assume that people compare their own mate-
rial payoff either with the payoff of each other player (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) or with the average payoff across all play-
ers involved (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). People feel inequity
if they are worse off or better off than their reference players,
leading to a reduction of utility. This reduction is larger for disad-
vantageous inequality, i.e., being worse off than others in material
terms, than for advantageous inequality, i.e., being better off (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999).
Recent event-related potential (ERP) studies document
that the distinction between equitable and disadvantageous
inequitable offers is already reflected by differences in an ERP
component occurring 270ms after the onset of an offer in the
ultimatum game (Polezzi et al., 2008). Characterized by a negative
deflection and being more pronounced with regard to inequitable
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as compared to equitable offers, this component was interpreted
in terms of the medial frontal negativity (MFN; Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002). These authors were one of the first who
observed such a negative deflection in the ERP after monetary
losses compared to gains. Dipole source modeling and results
from studies using fMRI suggest the MFN signal to be generated
in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Martin et al., 2009). Later studies supported this finding
and proposed the MFN signal to be related to the reinforcement
learning system (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). The reinforcement
theory states that the midbrain dopaminergic system codes the
subjective value of a certain outcome or object as a function of
expectancy. In that sense predicted rewards cause a phasic activa-
tion of dopaminergic neurons whereas the omission of a reward
leads to a depression. As predicted rewards do not increase the
firing rate, it is assumed that themesencephalic dopaminergic sys-
tem creates a reward prediction error signal which is conveyed to
cortical regions (e.g., the ACC) to allow for the adaption of the
behavior (Schultz, 1999, 2010).
In line with this assumption the MFN is usually observed
in tasks reflecting monetary losses after the onset of negative
feedback (Gehring andWilloughby, 2002), or after feedback indi-
cating an incorrect response (Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). Furthermore, the amplitude of the MFN is related
to subjective values like social norms (Boksem and de Cremer,
2010), i.e., being more pronounced following unfair offers com-
pared to fair offers when subjects are highly concerned by social
norms. These findings among others led to the suggestion that the
MFN is apparent whenever favorable or unfavorable events are
evaluated along an abstract “good-bad” dimension (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2004).
Along these lines one might speculate that the MFN indicates
the loss of utility when perceiving disadvantageous inequality.
Proposing that humans are inequality averse, unbalanced offers
unfair to one of the participants should be associated with more
pronounced MFN amplitudes than symmetrical offers. This view
is supported by behavioral studies showing that people prefer
an equal split (Güth et al., 2007) and recent neuroimaging stud-
ies reporting ACC activity during the processing of unfair offers
(Sanfey et al., 2003; Guroglu et al., 2011) Haruno and Frith (2010)
(using a different experimental paradigm) also found increased
activity in the ACC in relation to trials where participants received
less than their counterparts. Activation was independent of indi-
vidual differences in social value orientation.
The standard ultimatum game represents a useful behavioral
paradigm to study social aspects of decision-making as it is sim-
ple and has been studied extensively within various disciplines
and using different methods (for a review see Rilling and Sanfey,
2011). Nevertheless, this simplicity comes with some major limi-
tations. For instance, it presupposes that players have equal needs
for the payoff as it is usually played in an anonymous context.
In contrast, in a natural environment people mostly know with
whom they interact or have at least some information about their
counterpart. Another major disadvantage of the standard ulti-
matum game is the fact that players decide only for themselves,
and decisions are not influenced by the presence of other peo-
ple or groups. However, in real life we hardly make decisions
independently of others as others usually observe or are even able
to affect our decisions by their mere presence. The present study
therefore attempted to overcome this limitation by adding a third
player to the standard ultimatum game setup.
As already mentioned, an MFN can be observed whenever
subjects feel unfairly treated in the standard ultimatum game.
Yet, the question remains how subjects evaluate offers when the
proposer behaves unfairly toward someone else and when the
decisions made affect this third person as well. In particular, we
are interested in how the MFN amplitude is related to advanta-
geous inequality as compared to disadvantageous inequality as
well as to equity. In the present ERP study this question will be
systematically addressed by introducing a third player to the orig-
inal ultimatum game. In this version of the ultimatum game,
originally developed by Güth and van Damme (1998), a given
sum of money is split up between three players: the proposer, the
responder, and a dummy player, reflecting the powerless third. If
accepted by the subjects in the role of the responder, the money
will be allocated according to the split offered by the proposer;
otherwise, no player receives any money. The powerless third is in
a yoke-situation and has no decision role in the game. This way,
it is possible to study the relation between advantageous inequal-
ity (receiving more than the third player) and disadvantageous
inequality (receiving less than the third player). Furthermore, by
having such a fixed reference agent (the third dummy player)
in contrast to the consistently changing proposers (Sanfey et al.,
2003; Polezzi et al., 2008; Boksem and de Cremer, 2010) it is possi-
ble to focus on the impact of social motives that occur in strategic
social interactions.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighteen undergraduate students (six male; mean age =
23.2± 2.7 years) from the University of Vienna participated in
the experiment. Two of these subjects had to be excluded from
further analysis since post-experimental debriefing revealed that
they had not believed in the existence of a third player.
All subjects were naive to the experiment, had normal or ade-
quately corrected vision, and were healthy and right-handed, as
assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield,
1971). Scores for the EHI were above 70 in all subjects. Subjects
were paid for their participation the amount of money they
earned in four randomly chosen trials, resulting in earnings
between 15 and 20 Euros on average. Written informed con-
sent from each participant was obtained prior to the experiment.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki (1973, revised in 1983) and local guidelines and regula-
tions of the University of Vienna and the Faculty of Psychology.
STIMULUS MATERIAL
In order to design the experimental setting, realistic offers were
collected pre-experimentally following the strategy method intro-
duced by Selten (1965). To this end, we created six possible
allocations with a total sum of 15 Euros as well as another six
with a total of 12 Euros. Students from different Universities in
Vienna were asked to choose one offer from each group resulting
in two different offers for each student. After they had chosen the
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offers a photograph was taken. These photographs together with
the two offers formed the stimulus material used for the role of
the proposers.
Offers significant for the present study resulted from
81 subjects (40 males) and were either fair (1/3 of the total
amount) to all three players, unfair to the responder and the third
player (both received less than 15%), or unfair to only one player
(receiving less than 15%), whereas one of the others received at
least one third of the whole amount. In total each of these four
different categories consisted of 27 offers. The remaining 54 offers
were neither really unfair (less than 15%) nor fair (1/3 of the total
amount). In all these conditions the proposers allocated at least
1/3 of the total amount to themselves. In total 162 offers were
presented in six blocks with containing 27 offers each.
PARADIGM AND PROCEDURE
Participants played as responders in a modified version of the
three-person ultimatum game (Güth and van Damme, 1998). To
ensure that participants believed in the presence of a dummy
player, i.e., a third player, subjects were informed as part of the
cover story that a second subject of the same gender as the sub-
ject him/herself participated in the experiment in a different EEG
lab within the same building. In order to increase the feasibil-
ity of this setup, subjects were introduced to a second exper-
imenter who supposedly was in charge of preparing the third
player for EEG recordings and for running the experiment in the
other lab.
All subjects received written instructions about the experimen-
tal task and were informed that they themselves, as well as the
other players, would receive the amount of money from four ran-
domly chosen trials. To save money only the four most successful
proposers would receive compensation. Furthermore, subjects
were shown the questionnaires filled out by the proposers to
emphasize that the proposals were made by real persons. To avoid
possible effects on the decisions to be made due to the physical
appearance of the proposers, photographs were not presented
prior to each offer (cf. Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999), but—
following a suggestion by Knoch and colleagues (2006)—prior to
each of the six blocks.
Hence, each block started with the presentation of pho-
tographs of the 27 proposers of the upcoming trials, followed by
27 offers which subjects had to accept or reject (Figure 1). The
presentation of these offers, written in German (light gray back-
ground, black font color), consisted of three lines: the first line
always contained the amount the proposer wanted to keep (e.g.,
“John gets 4C”), the second indicated the amount the responder,
i.e., the participant, would receive (e.g., “You get 4C”), and the
third line indicated the amount the third player would get (e.g.,
“Player 2 gets 4C”). After 4000ms two squares appeared below
the offer, each of which either contained the word “accept” or
“reject.” These two alternatives changed the position randomly
among the trials. Subjects were instructed to press the corre-
sponding button of a response pad (PST Serial Response Box by
Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) with their right hand to indi-
cate the chosen alternative. Immediately after the response, a
feedback of the actual allocation (format similar to the offers)
was given for 2000ms. A variable interval of a mean duration of
2500ms ± 200ms presenting a black fixation cross on a light gray
screen separated the trials (offers). At the end of each block sub-
jects were informed about the amount of money they had gained
so far. To further ensure that participants believed in the pres-
ence of the other participant, i.e., the third player, 12 randomly
chosen trials were followed by questions concerning the current
offer (e.g., “Was the proposer male or female?”). Subjects were
told that these questions have to be answered by the third player
to maintain his or her attention to the task. As there was no real
dummy player, answers in reality were given by the experimenter
who was in a different room. Initiated at the subjects’ own pace,
FIGURE 1 | Single-trial setting. Trials started with a fixation cross with a
variable time interval, followed by the presentation of the offer. After the
duration of 4 s two boxes appeared at the bottom of the screen indicating
that participants can respond. Upon pressing the button, the feedback was
presented. On 12 randomly chosen trials the feedback was followed by
questions to be answered by the third player.
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the next block of trials started, again with the introduction of the
subsequent proposers.
Stimulus presentation was controlled by a Pentium IV
3.00GHz computer and E-prime software (E-prime 2.0,
Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). The
whole experiment lasted for approximately 50min including the
short breaks between the blocks. After the experimental session
the subjects were debriefed, i.e., they were informed about the
purpose of the experiment and the fact that no real third player
had been present.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS
Participants were seated comfortably in a sound-attenuated and
dimly lit room in front of a 19 inch cathode ray tube moni-
tor. EEG data from each subject were recorded via 61 Ag/AgCl
equidistantly located scalp electrodes embedded in an elastic
cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching, Germany; montage M10),
referenced to non-cephalic balanced sterno-vertebral electrodes
(Stephenson and Gibbs, 1951). For eye movement artifact correc-
tion vertical and horizontal electro-oculograms (VEOG, HEOG)
were recorded bipolar from above and below the left eye VEOG
and from right and left outer canthi HEOG. The subjects’
skin was slightly scratched with a sterile needle at all record-
ing sites in order to minimize skin potential artifacts and to
ascertain homogeneous electrode impedances below 2 k. Signals
were amplified using a DC-amplifier with high baseline stability
and an input impedance of 100 G (Ing. Kurt Zickler GmbH,
Pfaffstätten, Austria). Signals were digitized with a 1 kHz sam-
pling rate and recorded within a frequency range from DC to
250Hz.
DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS
Reaction times (RT) were transformed using a logarithmic func-
tion (Knutson et al., 2007). RTs were then analyzed by means
of a repeated-measures ANOVA with the two within-subjects
factors self-related fairness (levels: fair, unfair) and other-related
fairness (levels: fair, unfair); the first being the assignment to
the responder and the second to the dummy player. For the
comparison of rejection rates, a Friedman test was used.
Eye movement and blink artifacts were first eliminated using
a linear regression approach on the basis of parameters obtained
in pre-experimental calibration trials (Bauer and Lauber, 1979).
Blink coefficients were identified using a template matching pro-
cedure. Blink correction was then performed by subtracting verti-
cal and horizontal EOG signals weighted this way from each EEG
channel. Subsequently, epochs of 800ms following the presenta-
tion onset of the offer were extracted and baseline-corrected by
subtracting the mean amplitude in the interval 200ms before pre-
sentation onset. Data were then down-sampled to 250 smp/s and
low pass filtered (6dB/octave slope) at 30Hz cutoff. Before averag-
ing the data were detrended, i.e., linear trends in the EEG signals
were removed using the function “detrend” provided by EEGLAB
6.03b (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). To further improve data
quality, e.g., correcting for residual artifacts occurring repeatedly,
we followed the approach as outlined in Delorme et al. (2007):
trials containing strong non-stereotype artifacts like movement
or muscle-artifacts were rejected from further analysis based
on visual inspection followed by an independent component
analysis (ICA) using the extended infomax algorithm (Bell and
Sejnowski, 1995; Lee et al., 1999) as implemented in the EEGLAB
toolbox 6.03b (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Individual inde-
pendent components were screened for time courses and maps
reflecting typical artifacts and then removed by back-projecting
only the remaining, non-artifact components to the voltage
time series.
Based on visual inspection of the grand-averaged waveforms
and scalp distributions of difference waves (Figures 2 and 3) the
MFN was quantified as the average baseline-corrected amplitude
value in the time range between 240 and 340ms after stimulus
(offer) onset at electrode FCz (Boksem and de Cremer, 2010;
Wu et al., 2011). To reduce confounding effects of other ERP
components on the amplitude of the MFN, we created differ-
ence waves by subtracting ERPs elicited by offers with an equal
share for all three players from the ERPs elicited by each of
the three inequitable offers (unfair share for the subject, the
dummy, or both). Additionally we created two difference waves
by subtracting MFNs during Other fair from Other unfair for
the two levels of fairness for the subject (Self fair, Self unfair).
FIGURE 2 | Grand average ERP waveforms at Fz, Fcz, Cz, and Pz for the offers: fair/fair (solid line), fair/unfair (dashed line), unfair/fair (gray line), or
unfair/unfair (dotted line). Negative is plotted up, Zeros on the timeline indicate the onset of the offer; format: responder/dummy.
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FIGURE 3 | Scalp potential topography of the average voltage
differences between equal offers (fair/fair) and the three unequal offers
(fair/unfair, unfair/fair and unfair/unfair) for the time point of the MFN
(240–340ms following offer onset). The bar chart depicts the respective
mean MFN amplitude values. Error bars indicate 1 SE.
MFN amplitudes of difference waves were quantified as the aver-
age voltage in the 280–360ms time interval at FCz, against the
pre-stimulus baseline.
MFN amplitude values at the selected location were submitted
to separate 2 × 2 repeated measurement ANOVAs with the fac-
tors Self (levels: fair and unfair offers to the responder) andOther
(levels: fair and unfair offers to the dummy player). These analyzes
were aimed to describe whether an observed effect can be inter-
preted in terms of the offer made to the responder (factor Self ),
or to the dummy player (factor Other; Boksem et al., 2011). All
factors were defined as within-subject factors. The degrees of free-
dom for repeated measures ANOVAs were Greenhouse–Geisser
corrected whenever appropriate. To test whether difference waves
are significantly different from zero a one-sample t-test was
applied to the average voltage between 280 and 360ms at FCz.
In addition, to scrutinize potential differences in processing the
outcome for the powerless third, controlled for the two outcomes
for the responding subject, we conducted a paired sample t-test
on MFN difference waves. For all analyses the significance thresh-
old was set to p ≤ 0.05. Finally, to assess the relation between early
neuronal processes and actual behavior,MFN amplitudes for each
condition as well as the associated difference waves (unfair minus
fair) at channel FCz were analyzed in relation to the rejection rates
of unequal offers using Pearson correlation coefficients (using
directed, one-tailed significance levels; based on the results of
Hewig et al., 2011).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Analysis of the RTs (see Table 1) revealed a significant main effect
for the factor Self [F(1, 15) = 9.591, p = 0.031, η2 = 0.275]
Table 1 | Behavioral results from the three-person ultimatum game.
fairR/fairD fairR/unfairD unfairR/fairD unfairR/
unfairD
Mean RT 1076.32 1221.96 1230.31 1150.16
(SD) (227.62) (251.42) (220.62) (231.59)
Rejection 3.00% 39.35% 64.96% 70.37%
Rate
Reaction times (in ms) with standard deviations in brackets and relative frequen-
cies of rejections (in %) are given.
and a significant Self × Other interaction [F(1, 15) = 5.682, p =
0.007, partial η2 = 0.390]. In case both—responder and
dummy—received an equally high share the shortest mean RTs
(1076.85ms, SD = 227.62) were observed, while offers unfair
to the responder but fair to the dummy showed the longest
mean RT (1230.31ms, SD = 220.62). There was a statisti-
cally significant difference in rejection rates depending on the
type of offer, χ2(3) = 22.552, p < 0.001. Post-hoc analyzes with
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests were conducted with a Bonferroni
correction applied, resulting in an individual significance level of
P = 0.008. There was no significant difference in rejection rates
when comparing offers with an unfair share for the responder
(unfair/fair vs. unfair/unfair; Z = −1.398, p = 0.162). Despite an
overall reduction in rejection rates for offers with a comparatively
low share for the dummy (fair/unfair), rejection rates did not
significantly differ from offers with a low share for both players
(unfair/unfair; Z = −2.120, p = 0.034) or offers with a low share
for the responder (unfair/fair, Z = −2.552, p = 0.011). However,
when both players received a fair share offers were accepted
significantly more often than all the other possible offers (all
p < 0.001).
ERP DATA
Analysis of the MFN amplitude revealed a significant main
effect for Self, [F(1, 15) = 5.589, p = 0.032, partial η2 = 0.271]
whereas, the factor Other did not reach significance [F(1, 15) =
1.033, p > 0.10, partial η2 = 0.064]. There were no signifi-
cant interaction effects [F(1, 15) = 1.253, p > 0.10, partial η2 =
0.077]. The largest, more negative going, MFN amplitude was
found for offers where only the responder received a low share
(mean ± SD, 1.79μV ± 3.64), and offers assigning a low share
to only the dummy were accompanied by the least pronounced
MFN amplitude (3.56μV ± 2.28; see Figure 2). Thus, the MFN
only distinguishes between fair and unfair offers for the respon-
der, being larger for unfair offers, irrespective of the share for
the dummy. Analysis of difference waves confirmed this finding.
Again, the amplitude of the difference wave associated with offers
that comprise a low share for the responder and a high share
for the other players (unfair/fair minus fair/fair) was most pro-
nounced and significantly different from zero (mean = −1.643,
t(15) = −2.491, p = 0.025, d = 0.881). Otherwise, subtracting
ERPs elicited by equal offers (fair/fair) from ERPs elicited by offers
with a low share for the dummy (fair/unfair) did not yield a dif-
ference wave significantly different from zero [t(15) = 0.199, p =
0.845, d = 0.069]. In addition, comparing unfair offers assigned
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to the dummy when responders themselves received a fair share
as compared to an unfair share did not yield a significant differ-
ence either [t(15) = 1.119, p = 0.281, dz = 0.028]. The ampli-
tudes of the difference waves reached their maximum 310ms
following offer onset, with a scalp distribution peaking over the
fronto-central area (Figure 3). The same applied for P3 neither
main effects nor interactions reached the level of significance
(all p > 0.093).
To investigate the relationship between electrophysiological
data and behavioral choices we conducted correlation analyzes.
Previous research on the standard ultimatum game found that
MFN amplitudes following fair offers were related to rejection
rates of offers with unequal splits (Hewig et al., 2011). Even
though this statistical relationship could not be explained by their
data and had not been measured or reported in previous studies,
similar results were obtained in the present study: MFN ampli-
tudes associated with equal offers were related to rejection rates of
offers with an unequal split (see Table 2). Notably, this was only
the case when responders themselves received a low share: rejec-
tions rates of offers with low shares for both players, the responder
and the dummy player, were positively related to the MFN ampli-
tude associated with equally fair offers (r = 0.46, p = 0.037).
Likewise, responders who frequently rejected offers with a low
share for themselves exhibited smaller MFN amplitudes following
equal offers (r = 0.60, p = 0.007). No correlations (p > 0.475)
were observed for the other correlation analyses (see Table 2 for
all correlations).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate how the behavioral
and neural responses of a responder in an ultimatum game
are affected by a third, passive player. Since the MFN has been
associated with early evaluation processes in economic decision-
making, the analysis focused on this ERP component. Usually the
MFN is more negative going when people experience an undesir-
able outcome or event compared to a more acceptable one. We
assumed that involving a third player might affect the way people
evaluate their payoffs, and in turnmodulate the MFN amplitudes.
To this end, we recorded EEG from participants playing in the
role of the responders in a modified version of the three-person
ultimatum game. Overall, the results indicate that people dissoci-
ate between high and low offers assigned to them. In particular,
the amplitude differences about 300ms after the presentation of
the offer can be mainly explained by the share for oneself, while
the non-significant main effect for other-related fairness sug-
gests that the subjects’ neural responses were not indexing the
Table 2 | Correlations between mean MFN amplitudes for equal
(fair/fair) offers and rejection rates of the different offers ∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05.
fairR/fairD fairR/unfairD unfairR/fairD unfairR/
unfairD
MFN at −0.071 0.017 0.598∗∗ 0.458∗∗
FCz
fairness of offers to the powerless third. In addition, no effect
was found when comparing difference waves between fair and
unfair offers assigned to the powerless third. Furthermore, though
there seems to be a relation between MFN amplitude and behav-
ior in the ultimatum game (Hewig et al., 2011), this effect was
only observed with offers that negatively affected the responder’s
payoff.
Previous ERP studies on the two-person ultimatum game
have shown that offers with a low share for the responder were
associated with more pronounced MFN amplitudes as com-
pared to offers with equal ones (Boksem and de Cremer, 2010;
Hewig et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2011). The MFN is believed to
reflect a subjective motivational judgment indicating whether
an event or outcome is better or worse than expected (Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). In line with
this assumption people who are more concerned about fair-
ness norms exhibit more pronouncedMFN amplitudes following
norm violations in the ultimatum game (Boksem and de Cremer,
2010). Furthermore, several authors have shown that an MFN
can be observed when gambling task outcomes refer to some-
one else (van Schie et al., 2004; Fukushima and Hiraki, 2006).
Even when the task performance of others does not affect the sub-
jects themselves, particularly those with high trait empathy have
higher MFN amplitudes when the other person makes a mistake
and loses money (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009). Therefore, we
assumed that the MFN would be as well modulated by an unfair
share toward the third player. According to a recent neuroimag-
ing study advantageous inequity as compared to disadvantageous
inequity is less rewarding as indicated by reduced activity in
brain areas that are associated with reward processing. Subjects
who were better off in material terms than their counterparts
showed less activity in ventral striatum and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex when they received money that augmented the
difference in payoff (Tricomi et al., 2010). Following the con-
cept of inequality aversion, we expected unequal offers always
to be associated with higher MFN amplitudes than equal ones.
This assumption was not confirmed by the data. A recent study
using the two-person ultimatum game found that MFN ampli-
tude differences following fair and unfair offers were not mod-
ulated by observing the allocation outcome of other unrelated
responder—proposer dyads (Wu et al., 2011). Involving a third
player we found similar results as Wu and colleagues, suggest-
ing that neither an external reference point nor a fixed reference
agent clearly modulate this early ERP component. Furthermore,
in a social comparison task prosocial subjects responded with
higher amygdala activity and felt more unpleasant in response to
unequal payoffs. Individualist showed the opposite pattern, i.e.,
an increase in reward difference was associated with decreased
activity in the amygdala (Haruno and Frith, 2010). The ACC,
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior insula, i.e.,
brain areas that have been associated with the processing of unfair
offers in the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003), were found
to show higher activity when subjects received less than their
counterpart. Interestingly those regions were similarly activated
in prosocial subjects and individualist. Since it is supposed that
the MFN is generated in the ACC according to Gehring and
Willoughby (2002), our results broaden these findings due to the
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higher temporal resolution of the EEG and suggest that the ini-
tial response is mainly self-related. Nevertheless, it is important
to remember that the three players in our experiment remained
anonymous to each other, which is the standard procedure in
these kind of paradigms (Camerer and Richard, 1995; Güth
et al., 2007). This is in contrast to studies that found evidence
for a component that might be interpreted as an other-related
MFN where pairs were either seated in the same room or knew
each other already prior to the experiment (Fukushima and
Hiraki, 2006, 2009). Thus, it might be possible that decreasing
the degree of psychological or physical distance between play-
ers might have resulted in different behavioral and neuronal
responses.
However, concerning the behavioral responses we found con-
sistency with previous behavioral studies. Participants preferred
equal shares, whereas offers with a low share for the responder
were rejected most frequently (Güth et al., 2007). Furthermore,
in line with previous ERP studies (Boksem and de Cremer, 2010;
Hewig et al., 2011) no relation between the amplitude of the MFN
difference wave and rejection rates was found. Nevertheless, the
MFN amplitude following equitable offers was highly related to
rejection rates of offers with low shares for the responder. This
finding has already been reported in previous studies on the
two-person ultimatum game (e.g., Hewig et al., 2011). Several
studies on the MFN are based on the assumption that alter-
ations of the amplitudes are solely related to the processing of
negative events or events that are worse than expected (Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). According to
Holroyd and Coles (2002, 2008), though, unexpected negative
events would have an enhancing effect, unexpected positive events
would have an attenuating effect on the MFN amplitude. Pedroni
and colleagues (2011) argue that there are actually two processes
that occur at the time a MFN can be observed, an evaluation on
a good-bad dimension, as proposed in previous studies, and the
evaluation of the (positive) reward value. In light of the assump-
tion that positive and particularly unexpected positive events lead
to a change in MFN amplitude, Hewig and colleagues (2011)
propose two possible explanations for the relation between rejec-
tions rates and MFN amplitudes following equal offers. Either
more reward sensitive participants reject unfair offers because
they are disappointed, or those who expect others to be self-
ish are more likely to reject unfair offers, due to their negative
view of others. More precisely, if offers with a high share for
oneself are related to stronger reward-related responses, these
offers are also accompanied by a reduction in MFN amplitude.
In this regard participants with lower MFN amplitudes following
equal offers are more disappointed when offered a relatively small
amount and hereupon reject these proposals. On the other hand,
if participants believe that proposers are rather selfish by keep-
ing most of the money for themselves, they may expect receiving
mainly unequal offers. This negative view of others might lead
to higher rejection rates and smaller MFN amplitudes in relation
to equal “better than expected” proposals. Our findings provide
some new insights on this relation between neural and behav-
ioral response. In the study by Hewig and colleagues (2011) offers
with an equal amount for both players represented the high-
est possible reward for the responder. In the present study there
are two possible conditions with high shares for the respon-
der. Equal offers as well as advantageous unequal offers denote
a high share for the responder. Assuming that reward sensitiv-
ity predicts decision behavior, both offers with high shares for
the responder should be related to rejection rates or at least
should be related to each other. Yet, such a relation could not be
established in the present study. Only equal offers were related
to decision behavior. This evidence suggests that in the context
of social interaction our expectations concerning the behavior
of others might already guide our own behavior. Similarly, in
contradiction to the hypothesis that negative emotions follow-
ing unfair offers might facilitate memory for cheaters (Mealey
et al., 1996; Vanneste et al., 2007; Barclay, 2008), a recent study
on the standard two-person ultimatum game found that the pro-
posers’ behavior per se does not enhance memory. Conversely,
when offers did not meet the expectations of the responders,
they remembered the proposers’ face more efficiently (Chang and
Sanfey, 2009).
Importantly, the so-called power coalition—the third player
receives far less than the other two players—was rejected quite
frequently. Rejections of those offers were not at all related to
MFN amplitudes. Similarly, a recent study measuring skin con-
ductance response (SCR) revealed that an inequitable offer in
the standard two-person game is followed by an increase in
SCR. However, when people are playing the two-person ulti-
matum game on behalf of another person, they do not show
this increase in SCR following an unfair offer. Yet, these offers
were rejected as often as when playing for themselves. Therefore,
affective responses were solely related to self-relatedness, while
behavioral responses were not (Civai et al., 2010). This suggests
that economic decisions are not necessarily always related to the
emotional response—in particular when there is enough time
for a controlled, deliberative process. Yet, when these deliberative
processes are inhibited by time pressure, decisions as in the ulti-
matum game are only guided by affective processes as indicated
by an increase in rejection rate (Sutter et al., 2003; Cappelletti
et al., 2008). In the present study participants had unlimited
time to decide whether to accept or reject an offer, which might
also explain the discrepancy between the early neuronal and the
subsequent behavioral response, especially with regard to offers
that affect the third, passive player. Nevertheless, note that the
neuroimaging study on inequality aversion by Haruno and Frith
(2010) suggests that the amygdala activity in response to unequal
reward pairs reflects a rapid intuitive response. This assumption is
based on the finding that cognitive load had no effect on inequal-
ity aversion. Evaluation of reward differences and RT did not
differ in a high cognitive load compared to a low-load condition.
This is in line with behavioral studies on the ultimatum game
that found no difference in rejection rates under cognitive load,
whereas, responders reject unfair offers more often under time
pressure (Sutter et al., 2003; Cappelletti et al., 2008). Of course,
it would have been interesting to elucidate later parts of the deci-
sion making process, but this is beyond the scope of the present
work. Nevertheless, the relation between the different parts of
the decision-making process is of central importance to gain
a more accurate and exhaustive understanding of (economic)
decision-making.
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Taken together, the results of the present study show that
inequality aversion cannot explain variability in the early
neuronal evaluation process. On an early neuronal level, humans
dislike disadvantageous inequality and seem to favor advanta-
geous inequality. Although the decision behavior observed in
this study suggests that humans care about the powerless third,
there is no evidence for an early affective response suggesting
that subjects do not care about what the other person receives.
Thus, we propose that the first automatic response to inequality
is mainly self-related, whereas, concerns for the well-being of oth-
ers are part of higher cognitive, deliberative or intuitive processes
following the first automatic response.
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